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T. A. Smedley*
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IV. ENFORCEMENT OF PROPERTY SETTLEMENT
V. MISCELLANEOUS: SUPPORT AwARDs, PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS, CONTEMPT,
CUSTODY
Though most of the family law decisions of the supreme court and
appellate courts of Tennessee reported during 1964 were of the com-
mon garden variety, four cases presented issues of notable significance,
and in three of them the supreme court seems to have decided
questions of first impression in this jurisdiction.1 As usual, the most
common cause of controversy lay in matters of alimony, child support,
and property settlements; but there were also decisions regarding
grounds for divorce, child custody, the wife's right to damages for
loss of the husband's consortium, and the parents' liability for a child's
tort. Three other decisions are of interest mainly because of the
conflict-of-laws problem presented,2 and these will be dealt with in
the Conflicts section of the Survey.3
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Illinois and Virginia Bars.
1. Morrissey v. Morrissey, 377 S.W.2d 944 (Tenn. 1964); Rush v. Great Am. Ins.
Co., 376 S.W.2d 454 (Tenn. 1964); Bocock v. Rose, 373 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1963).
2. Coury v. State ex rel. Webster, 374 S.W.2d 397 (Tenn. 1964), held that a
Tennessee court has jurisdiction to decide the question of custody of the children
after the wife was granted a divorce and custody by an Oklahoma court, which later
authorized her to take the children to Tennessee, where she eventually became
domiciled. The Oklahoma court's custody order was not entitled to full faith and
credit and was not binding on the Tennessee courts after the children had become
residents of Tennessee.
Burton v. Burton, 376 S.W.2d 504 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1963), held that the right
of a wife, a Tennessee resident, to support by the husband was terminated by a
decree of a Texas court awarding him an absolute divorce. Even though the wife
had received only constructive service in the Texas divorce proceeding, the decree
was entitled to full faith and credit because Texas was the only matrimonial domicile.
Strube v. Strube, 379 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1963), held that a decree of a
Georgia court granting the wife a divorce and custody of the children was entitled
to full faith and credit as against the husband's claim for custody after he moved to
Tennessee and obtained possession of the children. Since the wife had moved to
Florida, if any change of custody is in order, it should be made by decree of the
court at the wife's place of residence.




I. GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE
In Reitano v. Reitano,4 an appellate court applied with somewhat
unusual liberality a generally recognized interpretation of what
constitutes cruelty as a ground for divorce. The husband had sued for
a divorce on the ground of cruelty, his complaint alleging, among
other things that the wife had "carried on intimate and [sic] associa-
tions with another man... and that this co-respondent will be named
at the hearing." The wife filed an answer denying the charges and a
cross-bill for divorce on the ground of cruelty. In his answer to the
cross-bill, the husband averred that the wife "was carrying on illicit
associations with her employer as alleged in the original bill." At the
trial, the husband produced no credible evidence to support these
charges of illicit relations, and he admitted in his testimony that he
had no basis for thinking that his wife had actually had sexual rela-
tions with the named co-respondent or any other man. The circuit
court dismissed the original bill and granted the wife an absolute
divorce on grounds of cruelty and abandonment. The court of appeals
modified the decree to make it rest on cruelty alone. In support of
its affirmance of the granting of the divorce, the appellate court
referred only to the rule that "false charges of adultery constitute
cruel and inhuman treatment as a ground for divorce."5
Though this proposition was announced in a dictum by the Ten-
nessee court as early as 1855,6 the decisions which are commonly cited
as authority do not appear expressly to adopt it nor clearly to rest
on it. Rather, in each of them the basis for divorce was proof that the
defendant had been guilty of various types of misconduct toward the
plaintiff, including physical violence or severe threats thereof, abusive
language, and extreme quarrelsomeness, as well as false accusation
of infidelity, the cumulative effect of which constituted cruelty.7 In
cases decided in other jurisdictions also, it appears frequently to be
true that, while an unfounded charge of immorality or adultery may
4. 373 S.W.2d 213 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1963).
5. Id. at 219.
6. Shell v. Shell, 34 Tenn. 716 (1855). "We have recently held that deliberate and
repeated accusations of adultery against the wife, by her husband, without grounds,
is a sufficient cause [for divorce for cruelty]." Id. at 728. The recent holding is
not cited, however. Watson v. Watson, 25 Tenn. App. 28, 33-34, 149 S.W.2d 953, 956
(M.S. 1940), reiterated this rule in dictum.
7. Parks v. Parks, 158 Tenn. 91, 11 S.W.2d 680 (1928); McClanahan v. McClanahan,
104 Tenn. 217, 56 S.W. 858 (1900); Lyle v. Lyle, 86 Tenn. 372, 6 S.W. 878 (1888);
Sharp v. Sharp, 34 Tenn. 496 (1855). The latter case may be the decision referred
to in Shell v. Shell, supra note 6, but the proof indicates that the defendant had
committed acts of physical brutality, bad defrauded the complainant in a pre-nuptial
property settlement, bad often flown into rages and threatened her, and had repeatedly




be the most emphasized factor in the defendant's objectionable con-
duct, other wrongful acts are also cited as contributing to the ultimate
finding of such cruelty as constitutes a ground for divorce." In the
Reitano case, the wife's cross-bill alleged other acts of the husband
to support the charge of cruelty, but they were of such a relatively
mild nature as not to add much weight to the complaint;9 and the
appellate court made no mention of them except in the statement of
the facts, but rather referred only to the false charges of adultery as
constituting cruelty.
If this decision indicates a more liberal point of view than most
previous Tennessee cases, 10 it is yet supported by what has been
termed the great weight of authority in other jurisdictions." And
the result is further sustained by the fact that the husband's accusa-
tions were made, not only orally to the wife's mother, but also as
formal allegations in his complaint and his answer to the cross-bill.'2
In such circumstances, the charges are likely to receive considerable
publicity, tend to be viewed by the public as having substance, and
take on permanency as a part of the court's record. Once the accusa-
tions have been published in this manner, it seems highly improbable
that the parties can ever be reconciled, 3 and quite likely that the
falsely accused spouse will suffer the harmful consequences which
most jurisdictions require as an element of cruelty justifying divorce.
This element is variously stated as impairment or threat of impairment
of health, or severe anguish, or extreme mental suffering, which
renders further cohabitation with the wrongdoing spouse intolerable.14
8. See Annot., 143 A.L.R. 623, 643 (1943); Note, 28 MicH. L. REv. 937 (1930).
9. See Reitano v. Reitano, supra note 4, at 214: rude, callous and cold treatment of
wife's parents; refusal to attend church with wife; neglect of wife when she was ill;
showing preference toward their older child.
10. It is true that Beard v. Beard, 158 Tenn. 437, 439, 14 S.W.2d 745, 746 (1929),
declares unequivocally that, "The publication of a false accusation of adultery by a
husband against the wife constitutes cause for divorce." However, the supreme court
only indicated that there was material evidence to support the findings of the chancellor
and the court of appeals that plaintiff was entitled to a divorce, and ruled that the
findings below were therefore not open to review in the supreme court. As authority
for the rule set out above, only the Sharp, Lyle, and McClanahan cases, supra note 7,
were cited, and as already noted, in each of those cases numerous acts of cruelty, in
addition to the false accusations, were alleged.
11. See Annot., 143 A.L.R. 623-24 (1943), citing many cases from various states;
Note, 24 Ky. L.J. 98 (1935).
12. That a false charge of infidelity made in a divorce complaint or in an answer
to such a complaint may constitute cruelty, see cases cited in Annot., 51 A.L.R. 1188
(1927). It may be significant that in Beard v. Beard, supra note 10, the false charges
of adultery were made in a divorce complaint.
13. See Note, 24 Ky. L.J. 98 (1935); Note 28 MIcH. L. REv. 937 (1930).
14. Babcock v. Babcock, 117 Conn. 310, 167 Atl. 815 (1933); Massey v. Massey,
40 Ind. App. 407, 80 N.E. 977 (1907); Annot., 143 A.L.R. 623, 640 (1943). In the
Reitano case the wife's cross-bill averred that the husband's misconduct was such as to
render cohabitation unsafe and improper. 373 S.W.2d at 214. This phraseology is
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A further requisite is that the false charges were made recklessly,
wilfully, maliciously or without probable cause;15 a good faith accusa-
tion made with some reasonable basis will not constitute cruelty
even though it is groundless and the maligned party is completely
innocent.
The trial judge in the Reitano case found that the husband had no
reasonable cause to believe that the wife had engaged in sexual rela-
tions with other men. He then went on to express concern over the
fact that such allegations had been included in the husband's com-
plaint and answer when there was no evidence to support them, and
decried the "reckless license" that was taken with the reputations
of innocent persons. "I am thoroughly ashamed," he concluded, "that
the facilities of this Court were taken for that purpose and used so
recklessly."16 It is to be hoped that such references to the nature
of the professional responsibilities of lawyers engaged in divorce liti-
gation may have a salutary effect.
II. Wi'F's RECOVERY FOR Loss OF CONSoRTrum
Faced with another issue not previously settled in Tennessee, the
supreme court in Rush v. Great American Insurance Co. 17 demon-
strated a strong reluctance to deviate from a rule which it found to be
the established common law in a large majority of the states. A
married woman brought an action for damages for the loss of consor-
tium of her husband resulting from serious personal injuries sustained
by him in an automobile accident allegedly caused by defendant's
negligence. 8 The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer and
dismissed the case on the ground that a wife cannot maintain suit
for loss of her husband's consortium. On appeal, the supreme court
affirmed, concluding its opinion with the statement: "We do not think
standard in Tennessee cases charging cruelty as a ground for divorce. See Sharp v.
Sharp, supra note 7, at 497; Parks v. Parks, supra note 7, at 94, 11 S.W.2d at 681.
15. Steele v. Steele, 237 Mich. 639, 213 N.W. 66 (1927); McArthur v. McArthur,
135 N.J. Eq. 215, 37 A.2d 76 (T. Err. & App. 1944); Annot., 143 A.L.R. 623, 634,
638 (1943); Annot., 51 A.L.R. 1188, 1191 (1927).
16. Reitano v. Reitano, supra note 4, at 219. The husband testified that he had
not said that the wife had had sexual relations with anyone else but had only told
his attorney that the wife had carried on improperly with her employer, and that the
attorney had chosen to insert the phrases "intimate associations," "co-respondent" and
"illicit associations" in the complaint and the answer to the cross-bill. Though the
attorney argued that such terms as "intimate" and "illicit" do not necessarily imply
sexual improprieties, the trial judge declined to believe that anyone is so naive as not
to understand the clear intent of the language used.
17. 376 S.W.2d 454 (Tenn. 1964); 6 WHI.xIA & MAnY L. IEv. 97 (1965).
18. Plaintiff's declaration alleged that the husband had been severely injured in
the groin and pelvic regions and that his reproductive organs were so seriously damaged
as to raise grave doubts regarding his virility.
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it is within our province to create in this State a new action which
was unknown at the common law and has not been provided for by
statute." 9
It is uncontroverted that, prior to 1950, no state recognized a cause
of action in the wife for loss of her husband's consortium, resulting
from a negligently inflicted injury.20 Various reasons were advanced
in support of this rule. Mainly, the courts pointed to the fact that the
common law disabilities of coverture prevented the wife from having
such a cause of action because she could not own property separately
from her husband and so could have no property right in her husband's
consortium, and consequently, no cause of action for loss thereof.
The married women's acts were held not to change the situation, as
they only removed procedural obstacles to her ability to sue, and
did not create new causes of action. These courts also termed the
wife's loss too indirect or remote to sustain recovery, and were con-
cerned lest a recognition of such a right of action would result in
awarding of highly speculative damages or in double recovery for the
same loss,21 since the husband had a personal cause of action for
loss of earning capacity, and recovery for this item would serve
indirectly to compensate the wife for loss of support, which was
regarded as the main element of her rights to enjoy her husband's
consortium.22
Legal writers generally found the rule logically unsupportable, 2
and in 1950 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.24 re-examined the reasons for the denial of
such an action by the wife, found them to be no longer persuasive
under the present state of the law governing married womens' status,
and allowed a wife to recover the damages sought. As a consequence
of this breakthrough, the issue has been revived all across the nation;
and while in twenty jurisdictions the courts declined to recede from
the earlier common law position, in at least eleven jurisdictions the
19. Rush v. Great Am. Ins. Co., supra note 17, at 459.
20. McCopmcjc, DAmAGFS § 92 (1935); Pnossma, ToRTs § 119 (3d ed. 1964).
Hipp v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921), bad held
such a cause of action existed, but that decision was overruled by Hinnant v. Tide
Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 120 S.E. 307 (1925). The right had also been recog-
nized in Ohio, but was abrogated in Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101,
112 N.E. 204 (1915).
21. See Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462 (1918).
22. For a full review of these reasons, see Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 852 (1950); Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1378, 1380-82
(1952); Note, 14 WASH. & LEE L. R V. 324 (1957).
23. See Pnossnn, op. cit. supra note 20, at 916-17 nn.17, 18. Kinnard, Right of
Wife To Sue for Loss of Consortium Due to a Negligent Injury to Her Husband, 35
Ky. L.J. 220 (1947). See Rush v. Great Am. Ins. Co., supra note 17, at 456.
24. Supra note 22.
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view of the Hitaffer case has been adopted.25
The growing minority view is based on the reasoning that the
married women's acts have wrought a fundamental change in the
common law concept of the marital relationship and indicate a
legislative purpose to place married women in an equal position with
men in respect to the ability to own property, to contract and to sue
and be sued.26 The effect of this legislation is that a wife is vested with
the capacity both to own property in the form of a cause of action for
loss of her husband's consortium and to bring suit to enforce this
cause.2 7 It is denied that the wife's loss is remote or consequential
in the sense of a lack of proximate causation or that the damages are
any more speculative than those which a husband recovers for loss
of an injured wife's consortium or those which any injured person
recovers for pain and suffering or mental anguish.28 And recognizing
a right of recovery in both the husband and wife is said not to
involve double recovery, because the defendant's wrong results in
two separate and distinct losses in two different persons.29 Further
demonstrating the illogic of the majority rule is the fact that the same
courts which adhere to it will allow a wife to recover damages for
loss of consortium from one who has intentionally injured the husband
or interfered with the marital relation.30
Some of the courts which persist in denying recovery to the wife
in cases of negligent injury to the husband have freely conceded that
the basis for that rule is no longer sound in the light of the legal
25. The states now recognizing the wife's cause of action are Arkansas, Delaware,
Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana (by federal court
decision), Nebraska (by federal court decision), and South Dakota. See cases cited
in Note, supra note 17, at 98 (1965). Oregon has adopted the same view by statute.
See Ellis v. Fallert, 209 Ore. 406, 307 P.2d 283 (1957).
26. As a means of eliminating the inequality of the rights of wife and husband in
regard to recovery for loss of consortium, several states, instead of creating a new
right in the favor of the wife, have abolished the traditional common law cause of
action of the husband. Rogers v. Boynton, 315 Mass, 279, 52 N.E.2d 576 (1943);
Carey v. Foster, 221 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Va. 1963), applying VA. CoDn ANN. § 55-36
(1950).
27. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., supra note 17; Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448
(N.D. Neb. 1953); Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W. 480 (1956).
28. See discussion in Note, supra note 22, at 327-28 (1957).
29. Kinnard, supra note 23. See Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Rela-
tions, 14 MicH. L. Rtv. 177, at 193-94 (1916).
The assumption of the majority that the wife's claim for loss of consortium is
essentially a claim for loss of support, is, of course, not justified by the generally
accepted definitions of consortium. They include within that term, not only loss of
support, but also loss of conjugal fellowship, love, companionship, affection, society,
comfort, solace, services, and sexual relations. See Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich.
33, 36, 101 N.W.2d 277, 228 (1960); Guevin v. Manchester St. Ry., 78 N.H. 289,
292, 99 Atl. 298, 301 (1916).
30. See PNossim, op. cit. supra note 20, at 917; Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d, 1378, 1389.
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status occupied by married women under modern law;31 some, on the
other hand, attempt to refute the legal arguments and discount the
practical considerations on which the minority view rests. 32 Both
groups concur finally that if a change in the law is to be made, it
should be made by the legislature. 33
In its opinion in the Rush case, the Tennessee court indicated that
it had attempted to read every reported decision on the issue in-
volved, but it dismissed the growing minority view with little more
than one terse sentence.3 The rest of the opinion is devoted to a
review of the authority supporting the majority view 35-which ap-
parently was completely persuasive to the court-and finally to the
declaration that any revision of the law in this field must come from
the legislature.
In view of the fact that in the short space of fifteen years a dozen
courts have recognized the wife's right to recover for loss of consor-
tium, and a number of others have also acknowledged the force of
the reasoning supporting such recovery, there are obviously some
quite substantial legal and policy bases for departing from the rule
denying this cause of action. In this situation, it is somewhat dis-
appointing to have the highest court of a state resolve the issue by
observing that such a remedy would be "a new action which was
unknown at the common law,"36 and that the matter must therefore
31. See, e.g., Baird v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. R.R. Co., 368 S.W.2d 172-74
(Ky. 1963): "The reasoning of the Hitaffer opinion basically rests on the epochal
evolution in the status and position of a wife from conditions which existed in olden
times under common law....
"In the present age the distinction between the right of a wife and of a husband to
maintain the action is at odds with reason." See also Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So.2d 420,
423 (Fla. 1952).
32. See, e.g., Roseberry v. Starkovich, 73 N.M. 211, 387 P.2d 321 (1963); Seagreaves
v. Legg, 127 S.E.2d 605 (W. Va. 1962).
33. E.g., Smith v. United Constr. Workers, 271 Ala. 42, 122 So.2d 153 (1960).
34. "A few jurisdictions have followed Hitaffer, but most of them continue to deny
the wife's claim." Rush v. Great Am. Ins. Co., supra note 1, at 456. Cf. FNossEa,
op. cit. supra note 20, at 918, for the statement that since 1958 "the trend has been
definitely in the direction of approval" of the wife's cause of action.
35. The court observed that, while it had never before considered the exact issue
of the case directly, it had done so "obliquely," citing two wrongful death cases in
which a surviving widow was held not to be entitled to recovery of damages for 'loss
of comfort and enjoyment," or for grief, mental anguish or solatium resulting from the
death of her husband. These decisions are hardly relevant to the matter of whether a
wife may recover for loss of consortium of a husband who survives the personal
injuries, because in the death cases, any claim must be based on a statutory cause of
action, and wrongful death statutes are generally construed to allow recovery for
only pecuniary losses sustained by the surviving kin. In the wife's suit for loss of
consortium, she is attempting to enforce a common law cause of action based on the
same considerations and allowing the same type of recovery as the common law action
which a husband may prosecute for damages for loss of his wife's consortium.
36. Rush v. Great Am. Ins. Co., supra note 17, at 459.
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be left to the legislature. The first observation seems to rest on the
premise that the common law was crystallized at some remote time
as an immutable body of rules which should forever prevail. On the
contrary, the strength of the common law as a living institution in a
changing world lies in the fact that it is continually being subjected
to judicial reinterpretation and modification as the culture in which
it operates produces new problems. Persistent reference to what the
common law "was" creates a danger of overlooking a fundamental
characteristic of the common law-that it not only "was" but that it
also "is," and that like any other vital living organism, it must con-
tinue to develop or it will die. Though the legislatures, of course,
have the power to alter the existing law by statute, legal history
demonstrates that the work of the courts in modifying the common
law has been at least of equal significance in keeping the legal system
consistent with the needs of a changing social order. While sufficient
justification may be found for either recognizing or denying a wife's
right to recover for loss of consortium, the function of the court before
which this problem is posed is well delineated by the Illinois Supreme
Court: 'We find no wisdom in abdicating to the legislature our
essential function of re-evaluating common-law concepts in the light
of present day realities. Nor do we find judicial sagacity in continually
looking backward and parroting the words and analyses of other
courts so as to embalm for posterity the legal concepts of the past."37
III. LIABILTY OF PAErN FOR TORTS OF Cmu
The scope of a parent's liability for damages for personal injuries
inflicted by the tortious conduct of a child was expanded in Bocock v.
Rose 38 beyond the limits previously recognized in this state. Plaintiff
sued the mother and father for damages resulting from an assault on
him by their minor sons. The complaint alleged that defendants
violated a duty to plaintiff by failing to restrain their sons from
exercising known propensities to assault others, and that as a result of
this failure, plaintiff was injured. Defendants' demurrer was sustained
by the trial court, but the supreme court reversed and remanded,
ruling that the complaint stated a cause of action. Acknowledging
that it was deciding a case of first impression, the court carefully
37. Dini v. Narditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 429, 170 N.E.2d 881, 892 (1960). See Novak
v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539, 547 (Mo. 1963): "The all-prevading
and overwhelming fact is that the concept of the inferior status of the wife has been
totally repudiated and for this court to perpetuate the erroneous denial of a right of
a wife based upon that repudiated early common-law concept on the ground that if the
manifest wrong is to be righted, it must be done by the legislature, would be an
improper avoidance of our judicial function."
38. 373 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1963).
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limited the scope of its rule by spelling out four conditions which
must be met in order to establish liability of a parent in such a case.
(1) The parent must have had the "opportunity and ability to control
the child"; (2) the parent must have known (or have had sufficient
reason for knowing) of "the child's habit, propensity or tendency
to commit specific wrongs"; (3) the specific acts must have been
such as "would normally be expected to cause injury to others"; and
(4) the parent must have failed "to exercise reasonable means of
controlling or restraining the child."3 9
The question of a parent's liability for the torts of a child seems
to have been raised on surprisingly few occasions before the higher
Tennessee courts. Such decisions as have been reported demonstrate
that the general rule of non-liability has been adopted in this state,4
but that liability will be imposed under the family purpose doctrine,
41
and under the dangerous instrumentality rule.42 It has also been indi-
cated that a parent may be held liable for injuries inflicted by the
child's use of an instrumentality which is not inherently dangerous
but which becomes a menace in the hands of an unusually irrespon-
sible, vicious or high-tempered child.4 In both of the latter situations,
liability is imposed, not on the basis of the parent-child relationship,
or of imputation of the child's wrong to the parent, but on the ground
that the parent is negligent in allowing the child to have possession
and use of such a device under such circumstances.
The supreme court specifically pointed out that these dangerous or
potentially dangerous instrumentality cases were not controlling in
the Bocock case, but emphasized that liability could only be based
on the parents' own negligence, which might be found in the failure to
restrain, discipline or control the child. While this is by no means a
novel theory,44 the Bocock decision represents what seems to be an
39. Bocock v. Rose, supra note 38, at 445.
40. King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S.W. 296 (1918). See MADDEN, PEiSONS
Am Domsnc REmAToNs § 117 (1931); PRossm, op. cit. supra note 20, at 892;
Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So. 2d 701, 705 (Fla. 1955): "The deed of a child, the
enactment of which results in barm to another . . . cannot be laid at the door of the
parents simply because the child happened to be born theirs."
41. King v. Smythe, supra note 40; Messer v. Reed, 186 Tenn. 94, 208 S.W.2d 528
(1948); Driver v. Smith, 47 Tenn. App. 505, 339 S.W.2d 135 (W.S. 1959).
42. Smith v. Salvaggio, 4 Tenn. Civ. App. 727, 731 (1914): "[I]t is well settled
law that a parent who permits his or her child to have possession of a deadly weapon
when, on account of the child's youth and inexperience, he is incompetent to be
entrusted with it, and the parent knows the danger that might happen to others from
the use of such weapon, or in the exercise of reasonable care should know it, is liable
for injuries inflicted upon the other by the child's reckless use of such weapon." (22-
calibre rifle in the hands of a nine-year old boy.)
43. Highsaw v. Creech, 17 Tenn. App. 573, 69 S.W.2d 249 (W.S. 1933) (air
rifle-no liability because of lack of proof that child was of abnormal nature or that
parents had knowledge of any vicious propensities of child).
44. See Paul v. Hummel, 43 Mo. 119 (1868); Norton v. Payne, 154 Wash. 241, 281
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increasing inclination in American courts to interpret the rule broadly
so as to support liability.45 This lengthening list of recent decisions
holding parents responsible for personal injuries inflicted by children
with known predispositions to harm others, and the impressive amount
of recent legislation placing liability on parents for property damage
intentionally caused by their minor children" appear to reflect a
growing concern in our society over the frequency with which
malicious acts of juvenile vandalism and terrorism are being com-
mitted. These statutes have been held to be constitutional when
attacked on due process grounds,47 though there may be some question
as to their effectiveness in reducing misconduct by children.48 It may
be significant that though Tennessee has had such a statute in effect
since 1957,49 no cases in which its provisions were applied have yet
been reported in the supreme or appellate courts of this state. The
Tennessee act provides that no recovery shall be had from the parent
if he "shows due care and diligence in his care and supervision" of
the child. This reservation is consistent with conditions which the
Pac. 991 (1929); Harper & Kime, The Duty To Control the Conduct of Another, 43
YALE L.J. 886, 893 (1934); RESTATMENT, TORTS § 316 (1934).
45. For recent cases recognizing the rule that a parent's liability may arise from
failure to restrain a child from committing tortious wrongs injuring others, even though
no dangerous or potentially dangerous instrumentality is involved, see Bieker v. Owens,
234 Ark. 97, 350 S.W.2d 552 (1961); Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 310, 253 P.2d
675 (1953); Gillespie v. Gallant, 24 Conn. Supp. 351, 190 A.2d 606 (1963); Gissen
v. Goodwill, supra note 40 (recovery denied because no proof of habit or propensity
of child to commit the wrongful act); Caldwell v. Zaher, 344 Mass. 590, 183 N.E.2d
706 (1962); Langford v. Shu, 258 N.C. 135, 128 S.E.2d 210 (1962); Landis v.
Condon, 95 Ohio App. 28, 116 N.E.2d 602 (1952); Condel v. Savo, 350 Pa. 350,
39 A.2d 51 (1944); Preston v. Duncan, 55 Wash. 2d 678, 349 P.2d 605 (1960).
46. See Comment, 3 VmLL. L. REv. 529, 536-37 (1958), listing 22 states with such
statutes, nearly all of which have been adopted since 1951. The states listed (with
citations) are: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana,
Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia and Wis-
consin. All except Louisiana limit liability to damages intentionally caused by the
child. All of the statutes cover property damage, though a few are limited to damage
to school and other public buildings; some extend also to personal injuries. Comment,
supra at 536-37, lists Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Louisiana, Ohio and Rhode Island
among the latter group.
47. General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963);
Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
48. Such a statute was passed by the New York legislature but was vetoed by the
Governor, who felt that the imposition of liability on parents was an unwise measure
because the penalty would fall most frequently on the lower income families where it
would cause the most hardship, and because the existence of such potential liability
might increase tensions between parents and children. See Comment, 28 U. KAN. Crr"
L. REv. 183, 187 (1960); Note, 55 MicE. L. REv. 1205, 1207 (1957).
49. T.NN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1001 to -1003 (Supp. 1964). Since the act limits the
parents' liability to $300 (a common limitation in this type of statute), it may be that
suits have been brought to enforce the liability, and the defendant parents have not
thought it worth while to appeal adverse judgments.
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Bocock decision places on the imposition of liability on parents,
indicating that both the legislature and the courts, while desirous
of providing compensation to the injured persons or property owners,
are taking a realistic view of the practical limitations which reduce
the parents' theoretical ability to control the conduct of their minor
children.50
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF PROPERTY SETrLMENT
Another apparent case of first impression, though the court did
not designate it as such, is Morrissey v. Morrissey,51 in which a
woman sought specific enforcement of a property settlement agree-
ment. The wife had been granted a divorce by the General Sessions
Court of Springfield, Tennessee, which approved and incorporated
into the final decree a property settlement previously made by the
parties. Thereafter, both parties moved to Davidson County, and the
wife brought suit in the chancery court of that county for specific
performance of the settlement contract. The chancellor denied relief,
and the supreme court affirmed the dismissal of the case. First, it
was pointed out that, by statute,52 every divorce decree which includes
a support order remains in the court which entered the decree, and
may be enforced or modified only by that court, even if both parties
move to another county. When complainant argued that she was not
attempting to enforce the divorce decree, but rather was seeking to
enforce the settlement agreement as a separate contract, the supreme
court responded by ruling that when the divorce court incorporated
the agreement into its decree, the agreement became merged in the
decree and lost its contractual nature.
This seems to be the first holding by the Tennessee Supreme
Court that a property settlement which is incorporated into a divorce
decree loses its separate identity so as to become unenforceable as a
distinct cause of action. At one point the court stated that Kizer v.
Bellar3 "is identical with the case now before us" except as to the
different courts involved;54 however, the Kizer case did not involve a
settlement agreement of the parties incorporated into the decree, but
50. "This is an era when strict, parental control of the children appears to be some-
what unfashionable. Children are faced with ever-increasing opportunity to become
involved in tortious acts. They have more instruments readily available to aid in
their difficulties. They are more free to act than at any time in our history. The
parent is thus faced with a problem that appears to defy solution." Comment, 28
U. KAN. Crr L. REv., 183, 205 (1960).
51. Supra note 1.
52. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-820, -828 (1956).
53. 192 Tenn. 540, 241 S.W.2d 561 (1951), holding that only the court which
enters the divorce decree awarding alimony and child support to the wife had juris-
diction to enforce the alimony provision.
54. Morrissey v., Morrissey, supra note 1, -at 945.
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only an alimony and child support award of the divorce court, which
the wife was attempting to enforce in another court. An appellate
court's decision in Doty v. Doty55 was cited in support of the rule
that -the property settlement merged into the decree and lost its
separate identity thereby; however, in the Doty case, the issue was
not whether such an agreement could be enforced as a separate cause
of action, but whether its incorporation into the divorce decree de-
prived the court of the statutory power to modify the support pro-
visions of the decree. The Doty case cited several other Tennessee
decisions, but in none of them was the issue whether specific per-
formance of the agreement could be obtained.56 They concur in de.
daring that "the agreement of the parties merely supplied the evidence
upon which the court fixed the award,"57 so that the support provision
stands as an order of the court, not the contract of the parties. This,
of course, does not necessarily mean that the agreement was destroyed
as a contractual obligation enforceable apart from the decree, and no
prior Tennessee case so holding has been found. One appellate court
decision has cited an Alabama case as ruling that an agreement of
the parties becomes "merged into the decree and thereby loses its
contractual nature . . ."; but that statement is concluded with the
qualification: "at least to the extent that the court has the power to
modify the decree when changed circumstances so justify."5 8
Further, it is to be noted that none of the Tennessee cases here dis-
cussed involved property settlements of the parties; rather, they dealt
with alimony and child support agreements which the courts approved
and made part of the decrees. In many jurisdictions, even though an
agreement of the parties regarding alimony and child support which
is incorporated into the decree remains within the power of the court
to change, an agreement settling their property rights is not subject
to such modification. 59 Under this view, the matter of whether the
55. 37 Tenn. App. 120, 260 S.W.2d 411 (W.S. 1952).
56. Perry v. Perry, 183 Tenn. 362, 192 S.W.2d 830 (1946); Brown v. Brown, 156
Tenn. 619, 4 S.W.2d 345 (1928); Osborne v. Osborne, 29 Tenn. App. 463, 197 S.W.2d
234 (E.S. 1946). In the Perry case, the support agreement which the divorce court
had incorporated into its decree was held to be void because the divorce was found to
have been obtained by collusion. In the Brown case, the issue was whether a decree
incorporating a property agreement of the parties was enforceable by contempt pro-
ceedings. In the Osborne case, and in Thomas v. Thomas, 46 Tenn. App. 572, 330
S.W.2d 583 (E.S. 1959), the question was the same as in the Doty case-the court's
power to modify. the support decree which had incorporated a settlement agreement of
the parties.
57. Doty v. Doty, supra note 55, at 125, 260 S.W.2d at 413.
58. Worthington v. Worthington, 224 Ala. 237, 240, 139 So. 334, 335 (1932),
quoted in Osborne v. Osborne, supra note 56, at 468, 197 S.W.2d at 236.
59. "As distinct from provisions dealing with alimony, a divorce agreement's property
settlement provisions, once adopted in the decree, are inviolable." Note, 20 U. Cur. L.
RBu. 138, 153 (1932). See also Erwin v. Erwin, 179 Ark. 192, 14 S.W.2d 1100 (1929);
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contract merged into the decree is irrelevant when, as in the
Morrissey case, property settlements are involved, and becomes sig-
nificant only when alimony or child support agreements are being
dealt with. However, the Tennessee courts seem not to have given
effect to this distinction;6° and the Morrissey decision gives further
indication that, for purposes of determining whether an agreement of
the parties loses its identity by incorporation into the decree and
therefore can be modified, property settlements and support agree-
ments are treated alike.
If no distinction is to be made between the different types of
agreements, the question of whether incorporation into a divorce
decree destroys the separate contractual effect of either should be
decided on the basis of the intention of the parties in having the
court give recognition to the agreement. If their purpose was to
have the court pass on the fairness of the terms, the reasonableness of
the benefits conferred and burdens imposed, and the voluntariness
of its adoption by the parties, so as to establish its validity, then the
fact that the agreement was "incorporated into the decree" so as to
become the basis for the support or property division provisions of the
decree should not extinguish the agreement as a source of independent
contractual liability. If, on the other hand, the purpose was to have
the agreement become part of the decree and to have the court order
its performance, the parties would seem to have intended the agree-
ment to merge into the decree and lose its identity as a separate
contract.61
If, on the basis of this test, it appears that the parties did not
intend to have a merger take place, the agreement should be speci-
fically enforceable in a suit in any court with jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter, quite apart from any proceedings
which might be brought in the divorce court to enforce the provisions
of the decree. Several courts, including one Tennessee appellate court,
have, in fact, provided substantially that remedy. 2
Hall v. Hall, 105 Colo. 227, 97 P.2d 415 (1939); Kohl v. Kohl, 330 IM. App. 284, 71
N.E.2d 358 (1947); Kistler v. Kistler, 141 Wis. 491, 124 N.W. 1028 (1910); Annot.,
166 A.L.R. 675-76, 693 (1947); Note, 19 So. CAL. L. REv. 70 (1945).
60. Doty v. Doty, supra note 55, at 125, 260 S.W.2d at 413, recognized the distinc-
tion as being observed in other states, but did not apply it. However, compare Johnson
v. Johnson, 51 Tenn. App. 205, 366 S.W.2d 141 (W.S. 1962) (court's property
division decree is not subject to subsequent modification; statute authorizes modification
only of allowances of periodic monthly payments).
61. Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Cal. 2d 55, 265 P.2d 865-66 (1954): "[It is first necessary
to determine whether the parties and the court intended a merger. If the agreement
is expressly set out in the decree, and the court orders that it be performed, it is
clear that a merger is intended. . . . On the other hand, the parties may intend
only to have the validity of the agreement established, and not to have it become part
of the decree enforceable as such." Note, 20 U. Cm. L. EV 138, 146 (1952). "
62. Newburger v. Newburger, 14 Tenn. App. 229 (W.S. 1932) (child support agree-
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If the parties to a divorce proceeding wish to make their own
final arrangements for support and property settlement, rather than
to have the court determine these matters in granting the divorce,
it seems that such a process of amicable negotiation and agreement
is generally preferable to adversary maneuvering during the trial and
court imposition of terms at the conclusion. The divorce court's role
is then only to determine whether the agreement was voluntary, fair
and reasonable; and the decision on these points merely declares the
validity of the subsisting separate contract. In accordance with the
parties' request, the divorce decree would contain no provisions re-
garding property division or support matters, 63 except that it would
refer to and approve the agreement of the parties. And that agree-
ment remains enforceable in the same manner as any other valid
contract. However, if the parties attempt to make their own separate
agreement, and then have it incorporated into the decree as the
court's support and property division determinations, difficulties may
well arise unless the original contract is held to have lost its separate
identity by merger into the decree. Otherwise, the divorce court, by
statute or by term of the decree, would have the power to modify its
own provisions in case of a change of circumstances, but the original
terms of an unmerged contract would remain enforceable. Thus, if a
change of conditions justified an increase in the wife's support allow-
ances, she could obtain a modification of the decree and enforce the
modified provision. However, if the husband should persuade the
court that a change had occurred which entitled him to a decrease in
the support allowances, the wife would still be able to obtain the
original amount by enforcing the terms of the parties' agreement as a
subsisting contract right. It would seem unwise and unfair to put the
husband in a position in which he could only be at a disadvantage by
having the divorce court adopt an agreement of the parties as the basis
for its support or property division award. And so, whenever the
parties request the court to make support and property settlement
matters a part of its decree, they should be held to have intended that
their agreement as to these matters is destroyed as a separate con-
tract.6 The result of the Morrissey decision is consistent with this line
ment); Coxe v. Coxe, 20 De. Ch. 384, 178 Ad. 104 (Ch. 1935) (property settlement);
Hudson v. Hudson, 36 N.J. 549, 178 A.2d 202 (1962) (judgment in N.J. court for
arrearages in payments of alimony and child support agreement which bad been
incorporated into Alabama divorce decree).
63. This procedure involves no violation of §§ 36-820 and 36-828 of the Tennessee
Code, as they merely state that the divorce court "may" make orders for support of
the wife and children, but do not require it to do so. And the parts of these sections
which provide that the orders shall remain in the control of the court for subsequent
modification surely apply only to the terms of support orders issued by the court and
not to the terms of agreements of the parties unincorporated into the decree.




of reasoning, though the language of the opinion leaves some doubt as
to when the court would be willing to recognize the continued exist-
ence of a support agreement as a separate contract. 5
V. MIscELLANEOUS: SUPPORT AWARDs, PROPERmTY SETTLEMENTs,
CONTEMPT, CUSTODY
Several other decisions dealt with family law questions of a more
routine nature, most of them relating to support matters. In Plumb
v. Plumb,66 the husband had obtained a divorce by a decree which
placed custody of one child in the husband and one in the wife who
was to receive 200 dollars a month for support of that child. Within
thirty days after the decree was entered, the husband petitioned the
court for reduction of the support award. The trial court granted a
reduction to 165 dollars per month, and the court of appeals affirmed,
holding that the court below had jurisdiction to modify the award
on either of two bases: (1) that the petition be treated as one for
a rehearing before the divorce decree became final, in which case
reduction of the award could be made to correct an error in the
original findings regarding the husband's ability to pay; or (2) that
the petition be treated as one for modification of a final decree because
of a change of the husband's financial circumstances.
The validity of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act was
upheld by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Martin v. Martin,
67
against the contention that it violates the state constitutional provision
against suspension of the general law for the benefit of any particular
individual68 because it permits a petition in a Tennessee court by a
non-resident on a pauper's oath whereas the general law allows resi-
dents to file suit on a pauper's oath only in certain other designated
types of cases.
69
65. E.g., the court quotes 17 Am. JuR. Divorce & Separation § 773 (1957): "It would
appear to be the almost universal rule that where a court has the general power to
modify a decree for alimony, such power is not affected by the fact that such a decree
for alimony refers to, or even incorporates or adopts, an agreement entered into by the
parties to the action." 377 S.W.2d at 946 (Emphasis added).
Also, the court asserted: "If such agreement stood alone it would probably be
met in the first instance by a proper plea or answer showing it was contrary to public
policy in that it is made on consideration that the parties get a divorce." Ibid. There
is no explanation of the import of the last clause of this statement, but certainly it is
not true that separation agreements made in contemplation of divorce to deal with
support and property settlement matters are inevitably "contrary to public policy."
See Smedley, Domestic Relations-1963 Tennessee Survey, 17 VND. L. REv. 1039,
1046 (1964).
66. 372 S.W.2d 771 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
67. 373 S.W.2d 609 (Tenn. 1963).
68. TENN. CoNsT. art. XI, § 8.
69. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-1629 (Supp. 1964).
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In Mayhew v. Mayhew,"0 it was held that the court which grants a
divorce and orders support payments retains exclusive jurisdiction
to enforce the decree, and that contempt proceedings for alleged
failure to comply with the support provisions cannot, therefore, be
brought in any other court.
Two cases dealt with the propriety of decrees by divorce courts
divesting wives of their interest in property owned jointly with their
husbands. In one instance the divestiture was held to be improper, the
property having been owned by the husband and wife as tenants by
the entireties, and having been purchased with the proceeds of the
sale of other property owned by them in the same capacity.71 In the
other case, the court was held to have acted properly under its statu-
tory authority to adjust the rights of the parties in jointly owned
property "so as to preserve for [the] husband that portion of such
property as for which he contributed and paid."
1 2
Finally, a decree awarding custody of daughters aged four and
seven to the husband because of the wife's illness was held to be in
error, in view of the general rule that "a mother, except in extraordi-
nary circumstances, should be with her child of tender years,"
especially since the evidence indicated that the mother could care for
the children in her parents' home, in spite of her poor health.73
70. 376 S.W.2d 324 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1963).
71. Lansing v. Lansing, 378 S.W.2d 786 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1963).
72. Wilson v. Andrew, 375 S.W.2d 650 (Tenn. 1963). The statute in question is
TrEr. CODE ANN. § 36-825 (1956). The section now in effect empowers the court to
act "so as to preserve for each or either party, that portion of such jointly owned
property as may be just and reasonable under the facts and circumstances of the
case ...." Temr. CoDE: ANN. § 36-825 (Supp. 1964). It was ruled that the court had
power to divest the wife of her property interest even though she was served by
publication only.
73. Bevins v. Bevins, 383 S.W.2d 780 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1964).
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